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Abstract 
This paper presents a cross-sectional analysis of the spatial distribution of loans in the primary and secondary 
mortgage markets. Aggregating loan originations to the MSA level, we examine the proportion of the market 
served by FHA and conventional lenders. We model the geographic differences in market shares as a function of 
supply, demand, and economic risk factors. Results indicate that FHA market shares are higher in cities with 
higher economic risk characteristics. To examine the role of GSE activity, we model the spatial distribution of the 
disposition of conventional loans. Again, we focus on the impact of local economic risk factors on the proportion 
of loans purchased by the GSEs, purchased by other financial institutions, or retained by the originating lender. 
Our results indicate that GSEs purchase rates are fairly insensitive to local economic conditions indicating that 
they serve the primary market with little spatial variation. 
Keywords 
Primary mortgage market, Secondary mortgage market, FHA, Government sponsored enterprises 
1. Introduction 
The US primary mortgage market is segmented into the government (FHA) insured loan market and the non-FHA 
insured (conventional) loan market. Traditionally, conventional financing is less costly for most borrowers, 
particularly with respect to private mortgage insurance premiums and processing time. Yet, FHA insured 
mortgages offer attractive alternatives to conventional mortgages for income and wealth constrained 
borrowers.1 
Underwriting guidelines that control conventional loan originations result from the interaction of the originating 
lender, the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE), and the private mortgage insurers. Although the 
underwriting decision may be diffuse, a natural (and not unrealistic) assumption is that profit-maximizing 
institutions alter originations (either by charging higher contract interest rates or by imposing tighter 
underwriting standards) in response to differences in economic risk. Spatial variation in conventional mortgage 
market shares is consistent with this behavior. In contrast, FHA has a historical mission to expand 
homeownership opportunities and thus charges a spatially invariant premium.2 Thus, in the first part of this 
study, we examine whether FHA market shares increase in areas with higher economic risk to determine 
whether FHA serves as a steadying force in the mortgage market.3 
The second part of this study focuses upon the disposition of conventional mortgages in the secondary 
mortgage market. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which GSE purchases vary spatially. Control 
over the final disposition of the mortgage loan — either retained in portfolio or sold on the secondary market 
(either to the GSEs or to another portfolio lender) — rests with the originating lender. Due to the size of the 
GSEs, however, their purchase activity has significant implications for whether the originating lender sells the 
mortgage and consequently on the availability of mortgage credit. The size of their respective mortgage 
operations together with the ‘implicit’ federal guarantee arising from their federal charter results in a significant 
capital costs advantage over other private institutions.4 Using this capital cost advantage, the GSEs have the 
ability to purchase mortgages from originators at more favorable rates than non-GSE portfolio lenders. Since the 
GSEs operate at the national level and require private mortgage insurance for loans with LTVs greater than 80%, 
their ability to alter their purchase activity based on local variations in risk is limited. Furthermore, given that the 
GSEs receive a subsidy (i.e., the implicit Federal guarantee), they face significant public policy pressure to serve 
all markets, further limiting any incentive to alter mortgage purchase activity in risky areas. 
But Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not identical institutions and may react differently to public policy 
pressures. For instance, Fannie Mae has indicated a willingness to continue purchasing loans in risky 
locations.5 In contrast, Freddie Mac has indicated a more conservative approach indicating that prudent lending 
is consistent with fewer purchases in riskier locations.6 Thus, we analyze Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase 
activity separately. 
In addition to the GSEs, other portfolio lenders have an impact on the ultimate disposition of mortgages in the 
secondary market. Portfolio lenders can either increase or decrease their mortgage purchases for a variety of 
factors, including changes in local economic risk or regulatory pressure to improve their CRA compliance. For 
example, institutions considering a future merger may actively purchase mortgages from areas with higher 
minority concentrations in order to bolster their CRA record in anticipation of increased scrutiny resulting from a 
merger application. Alternatively, portfolio lenders could seek higher returns by purchasing loans in riskier areas. 
We can shed light on the question of whether the GSEs are fulfilling their public policy mandate by examining 
whether the disposition of conventional loans in the secondary market varies systematically with local economic 
risk. Unfortunately, given the complexity of the primary mortgage market and the lack of information on private 
mortgage insurer activities, this study cannot conclusively determine whether GSE actions created any of the 
observed spatial variation in conventional originations. 
2. Data 
We utilize the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database to identify FHA and conventional single-family 
home purchase mortgages7 originated by MSA in 1995 and 1996 for 306 MSAs. By focusing the analysis at the 
MSA level, we are able to control for spatial variation in local economic risk. From HMDA, we determine the 
disposition of the conventional mortgages in the year of origination as either retained in portfolio, sold to the 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or another lender.8 In order to create as homogeneous a sample as possible, we do 
not include refinanced mortgages, or mortgages sold out of portfolio in years subsequent to origination.9 Thus, 
we calculate the percentage of loans insured by FHA for a given MSA as the number of FHA originations divided 
by the total number of loans in that MSA. Similarly, we calculate the percentage of mortgages originated as 
conventional loans by dividing the number of conventional originations by the total number of loans in that 
MSA. Reflecting the dominance of conventional lenders in terms of price and service, we find that, on average, 
conventional originations account for 84% of the single-family home purchase market. 
Table 1 provides a list of the variables used in the analysis as well as the descriptive statistics. The data clearly 
indicate that substantial variation exists in the market shares. In fact, the conventional lenders control almost all 
(over 99%) of the market in some MSAs (e.g., San Francisco, California or Wausau, Wisconsin) while FHA controls 
over 50% of the market in other areas (e.g., Lima, Ohio, or Riverside, California). This variation is not systematic 
to any particular region or state, but rather is specific to individual MSAs. For instance, while San Francisco and 
Stockton California are only 80 miles apart there is more than a 30-point spread in conventional market shares. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 1995 and 1996 
Description Sourcea Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Obs 
Dependent variable: home purchase originations        
Conventional market share HMDA CONV 0.8355 0.0980 0.4242 0.9952 612 
FHA market share HMDA FHA 0.1645 0.0980 0.0048 0.5758 612 
Dependent variable: final disposition of conventional loans        
Sold to Fannie Mae HMDA FMAE 0.1487 0.0575 0.0123 0.5166 612 
Sold to Freddie Mac HMDA FMAC 0.1129 0.0484 0.0188 0.3601 612 
Sold to non-GSEs HMDA OTH 0.1692 0.0706 0.0303 0.4158 612 
Held in Portfolio HMDA PORT 0.5692 0.1059 0.3146 0.9308 612 
MSA economic risk factors        
Conventional mortgage average FHFB LTV 0.7958 0.0273 0.7050 0.8450 612 
Loan to Value (LTV) ratio 
       
Conventional mortgage effective interest rate FHFB I 0.0783 0.0024 0.0710 0.0842 612 
Non-judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment states Statute Q1 0.3157 0.4532 0.0000 1.0000 612 
Non-judicial foreclosure and no deficiency judgment states Statute Q2 0.3102 0.4558 0.0000 1.0000 612 
Judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment states Statute Q3 0.3050 0.4510 0.0000 1.0000 612 
Judicial foreclosure and no deficiency judgment states Statute Q4 0.0691 0.2465 0.0000 1.0000 612 
One year percent change in house prices Freddie Mac ΔHP1 0.0428 0.0260 −0.0641 0.1258 612 
Ten year percent change in house prices Freddie Mac ΔHP10 0.4887 0.2346 0.0071 1.4677 612 
One year change in the unemployment rate DRI ΔU −0.0020 0.0093 −0.0600 0.0840 612 
Standard deviation of ΔHP for previous 15 years Freddie Mac σΔHP 0.0525 0.0298 0.0181 0.3021 612 
The 10 year average of the unemployment rate BLS U 0.0596 0.0269 0.0178 0.2260 612 
Demographic, regulatory, and FHA policy factors 
       
Percent of population residing in underserved census tracts Census USRVD 0.4010 0.1192 0.1536 0.8116 612 
Percent of population non-white Census MINOR 0.2233 0.1635 0.0183 0.9532 612 
GINI Coefficient for blacks in 1990 Census BGINI 0.3034 0.1573 0.0290 0.7710 612 
FHA loan limit/median house price HMDA & DRI LLHP 1.0317 0.1949 0.5881 1.8681 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to OCC HMDA OCC 0.2178 0.1083 0.0040 0.6786 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to FRB HMDA FRB 0.1426 0.0824 0.0028 0.4000 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to FDIC HMDA FDIC 0.1655 0.1180 0.0011 0.7156 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to OTS HMDA OTS 0.1696 0.1009 0.0005 0.4917 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to NCUA HMDA NCUA 0.0322 0.0325 0.0000 0.2128 612 
Percent of home purchase originations reporting to HUD HMDA HUD 0.2723 0.1224 0.0284 0.6462 612 
HUD regional dummies        
VT,ME,MA,RI,NH HUD NE 0.036 0.186 0 1 612 
AK,ID,OR,WA, HUD NW 0.046 0.209 0 1 612 
UT,CO,SD,WY,MT,ND HUD RM 0.055 0.228 0 1 612 
IL,IN,MI,MN,OH,WI HUD MW 0.180 0.384 0 1 612 
NY,NJ HUD NYNJ 0.069 0.253 0 1 612 
NV,CA,AZ,HI HUD P 0.101 0.302 0 1 612 
TX,OK,AR,NM,LA HUD SWt 0.150 0.358 0 1 612 
MO,IA,KS,NE HUD GPt 0.056 0.230 0 1 612 
FL,GA,KY,MS,TN,SC,AL,PR,NC HUD SEt 0.212 0.409 0 1 612 
DE,WV,DC,VA,MD,PA, HUD MAt 0.098 0.298 0 1 612 
a Source: HMDA, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act LARS & TS database; FHFB, Federal Housing and Finance Board web site; DRI, Standard & Poor’s DRI; 
BLS, The Bureau of Labor and Statistics; Census, The US Census Bureau, Freddie Mac; HUD, The Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Taking the subset of conventional originations, we calculate the GSE market share for each MSA by dividing the 
number of GSE purchased loans in the MSA by the total number of conventional originations in that MSA. The 
percentages of loans in each MSA held in portfolio or sold to other lenders are calculated similarly. While the 
majority of conventional loans are held in portfolio during the calendar year, in total Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac purchase 26% of the conventional single family home purchase market with Fannie Mae purchasing slightly 
more loans in aggregate. In examining the geographic disposition of mortgages purchased by the GSEs, we note 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchases are concentrated in different locations. For instance, Fannie Mae’s 
top 10 markets do not overlap with Freddie Mac’s top 10 markets.10 
To estimate differences in economic risk across individual MSAs, we include measures of lending, housing, and 
labor market risks at the local level. We focus on three aspects of the lending environment. First, because 
lenders and mortgage insurers utilize homeowner equity as one method of quantifying risk, we include the 
average conventional mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as reported by the Federal Housing Finance Board’s 
Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS).11 Since LTV is such an important component of underwriting, it can be 
argued that LTV and mortgage choice are jointly determined. In order to control for this endogenous 
relationship, we estimate LTV via an instrumental variables regression and utilize the predicted LTVs in 
subsequent regressions.12 Second, we include the average annual effective interest rate from MIRS as an 
indicator of the cost of borrowing (I). The effective interest rate proxies for the financial strain homebuyers 
experience making monthly payments. 
Based on simulation results from a theoretical model of mortgage default, Ambrose et al. (1997) hypothesize 
that borrowers living in states that allow lenders to obtain deficiency judgments will gravitate toward FHA since 
FHA has a policy of not seeking deficiency judgments against single-family owner-occupied borrowers.13 To 
empirically test this hypothesis, we include dummy variables representing differences in state laws regarding 
mortgage default and foreclosure. These variables classify states based on judicial versus non-judicial 
foreclosure laws and deficiency versus non-deficiency judgment states. Thus, Q1 indicates states that have non-
judicial foreclosure available and allow lenders to obtain deficiency judgments;14Q2 indicates states that have 
non-judicial foreclosure available but do not allow deficiency judgments;15Q3 indicates states that require 
judicial foreclosure and allow deficiency judgments;16 and finally Q4 indicates states that require judicial 
foreclosure and do not allow deficiency judgments.17 
While lender underwriting standards are designed to quantify individual borrower risk, at the aggregate level, 
we hypothesize that the supply of credit is a function of area economic risk factors. Empirical studies of credit 
risk have demonstrated a negative relation between house price appreciation and default loss.18 Thus, we 
estimate the percentage change in local house prices using the Freddie Mac MSA Repeat Sales Index where 
increases in house prices indicate areas that are experiencing economic growth and lower risk. Since we have no 
a priori indication of the appropriate length to capture a housing cycle, we include the change over the last year 
(ΔHP1) and over the last 10 years (ΔHP10) to capture short term and long term effects. We also estimate the 
overall volatility in the local housing market as an additional measure of local economic stability. Since 
ΔHP controls for the trend of house price appreciation for the MSA, we use the standard deviation of ΔHP over 
the last 15 years, σΔHP, to measure volatility. We interpret this variable as the volatility around the average 
growth rate of house prices. This variable tests whether greater volatility, regardless of price appreciation or 
depreciation, indicates greater risk to lenders. Economic risk is also associated with changes in local 
employment, as measured by the yearly change in the local unemployment rate (ΔU). The overall or long-term 
level of unemployment also provides an indication of economic distress, and thus, we include the average 
unemployment rate for each MSA over the last 10 years (U). 
In addition to economic risk, local demographic factors, regulatory, and public policy guidelines may also impact 
the demand for mortgages and their ultimate disposition in the secondary market. For example, the GSEs face 
affordable housing goals, which may alter their purchases of loans in various MSAs. Furthermore, regulatory 
pressure on conventional lenders can impact the number of loans retained in portfolio. For instance, GSE 
regulations require them to actively purchase mortgages from census tracts that traditionally have not been well 
served by the conventional market. Thus, we include a variable indicating the percentage of the population that 
resides in underserved census tracts (USRVD).19 If regulations requiring greater investment in these areas are 
successful, then market shares of conventional lenders and the GSEs should reflect these efforts. 
In order to capture variation in demand resulting from differences in area demographics, we include measures 
of the ethnic make up of the MSA. If minorities have preferences for certain types of lenders and mortgage 
products then locations with higher concentrations of minority groups may affect primary and secondary market 
shares. Alternatively, biases in the mortgage market or special programs focusing on minority groups should also 
affect market shares. Thus, we include the percent of the population that is non-white (MINOR) to indicate the 
net effect of these forces. We also incorporate a measure of local segregation (BGINI) to determine whether 
market shares vary depending on the level of racial segregation.20 
FHA regulatory guidelines determining the maximum loan amount that qualifies for FHA insurance have a direct 
impact on the primary mortgage market, particularly in areas characterized as having high-house prices. 
Although guidelines for setting mortgage limits are tied to area median home prices, current practice allows 
local HUD field offices to adjust these limits.21 Increasing the FHA mortgage limit can expand the eligible market 
for FHA lending, creating the potential for greater competition between FHA and conventional lenders. Thus, the 
larger the portion of the market that is eligible for FHA mortgage insurance the larger FHA market share should 
be. To capture the affect of FHA loan limits, we include the ratio of the MSA’s FHA loan limit to its media house 
price (LLHP). 
The organization of the mortgage lending industry can also affect the type of loan originated, whether those 
loans are held in portfolio, and who purchases them. To capture this affect we include the fraction of loans from 
HMDA that are reported to the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift and Supervision (OTS), the National Credit 
Union Association (NCUA), and the Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Due to concerns regarding changing 
reporting rates, especially for mortgage brokers, all regulatory share variables are lagged 1 year. Finally, we 
include variables to control for unobserved regional and time effects. 
3. Results 
3.1. FHA/Conventional Choice 
To estimate the impact of differences in local risk characteristics on conventional and FHA originations, we 
estimate a logit model of FHA and conventional market shares. Estimation results are reported in Table 2 and 
include the parameter coefficients, standard errors, χ2 statistics, and marginal probabilities. The model predicted 
FHA market share (evaluated at the data means) is 15.5% and the predicted conventional market share is 84.5%. 
This compares with the actual mean market shares of 16.4 and 83.6% for FHA and conventional lenders, 
respectively. Although all the parameter coefficients are significant, the market share proportions are based on 
large populations of loans, which results in model estimates with potentially low standard errors and 
high χ2 statistics.22 Thus, we rely on sensitivity analysis to show the economic significance of the model variables. 
Table 2. Logit Model of the market shares of conventional versus FHA home purchase originations 
P i=e (β′x i )1+e (β′x i )     




Intercept 18.09 0.269 67.2 2.64 
LTV −18.05 0.349 −51.8 −2.63 
I −33.39 0.776 −43.0 −4.86 
ΔHP1 5.06 0.070 72.2 0.74 
ΔHP10 0.26 0.013 20.3 0.04 
ΔU −6.48 0.191 −33.9 −0.94 
σΔHP 1.43 0.060 23.8 0.21 
U −3.98 0.076 −52.5 −0.58 
MINOR 0.61 0.022 27.3 0.09 
BGINI −0.14 0.010 −13.6 −0.02 
USRVD −0.46 0.030 −15.3 −0.07 
LLHP −1.04 0.009 −113.7 −0.15 
Q2 0.36 0.008 45.4 0.05 
Q3 0.35 0.004 90.8 0.05 
Q4 0.54 0.011 49.4 0.08 
NW 0.35 0.014 24.9 0.05 
MW 0.86 0.016 53.7 0.12 
NYNJ 0.98 0.010 98.2 0.14 
P 0.70 0.011 62.5 0.10 
SW 1.68 0.019 87.9 0.24 
GP 1.12 0.017 66.5 0.16 
SE 1.47 0.019 75.6 0.21 
NE 0.85 0.015 57.3 0.12 
MA 1.17 0.022 52.2 0.17 
FRB −0.31 0.027 −11.6 −0.05 
FDIC 1.28 0.025 50.4 0.19 
OTS 1.36 0.024 56.2 0.20 
NCUA 2.53 0.066 38.4 0.37 
HUD −1.19 0.022 −54.7 −0.17 
1995 0.14 0.004 37.1 0.02 
 
As expected, the economic risk factors capturing the variation in MSA house prices suggest that FHA market 
shares are higher in areas with greater risk. We find that conventional market shares are higher in areas that 
experienced positive increases in house prices (both in the previous year and over the last 10 years) and lower in 
areas with high average unemployment rates suggesting that more borrowers meet conventional lender 
underwriting standards in areas experiencing positive economic growth (and hence lower economic risk). In 
contrast, however, the positive and highly significant coefficient on the standard deviation in local house prices 
(σHP) indicates that conventional market shares increase in areas experiencing high volatility in house prices. In 
sum, the model coefficients suggest that a higher percentage of conventional originations occur in areas 
experiencing positive, but volatile growth while FHA market shares are higher in areas experiencing stable, but 
slow growth. 
In examining the impact of state default and foreclosure laws, we find that FHA market shares are higher in 
states that have non-judicial foreclosure laws and allow lenders to obtain deficiency judgments. This is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Ambrose et al. (1997) who note that, as a matter of policy FHA 
does not seek deficiency judgments against borrowers in default. Thus, it appears that borrowers recognize that 
the FHA policy is valuable in areas where borrowers are at risk of lender deficiency judgments. 
Turning to demographic and HUD policy variables, we find several interesting, yet conflicting effects. First, we 
find that FHA market shares increase as the number of geographically targeted loans in underserved census 
tracts (USRVD) increases, confirming prior expectations that FHA differentially serves underserved markets. In 
contrast, however, we find that FHA market shares actually decline as the percentage of minority applications 
increase. This result conflicts with previous research showing that minority borrowers tend to prefer the FHA 
mortgage insurance program. However, the marginal probabilities indicate that the effects of these variables are 
relatively modest with changes in market segregation having almost no impact on FHA or conventional market 
shares. 
To summarize, after controlling for geographic variation in mortgage supply and demand fundamentals, 
geographic variation in market institutional factors, as well as differences in demographic factors, our analysis 
indicates that FHA market shares are higher in high-risk areas, where riskiness is indicated by house price 
appreciation, downpayments, and unemployment rates. Thus, it appears that FHA is meeting its objective of 
stabilizing geographic variation in the supply of mortgage credit. 
3.2. Conventional mortgage disposition 
In this section, we focus on the disposition of conventional mortgages in the secondary market and highlight two 
policy considerations. First, we examine the sensitivity of market shares to local economic risk. Our second 
interest is on GSE market shares with respect to differences in the percentage of applicants from geographically 
targeted ‘underserved’ census tracts. Given the affordable housing targets recently established by HUD for the 
GSEs, we expect to find evidence that the GSEs purchase more loans from areas with a high concentration of 
targeted census tracts. 
Once a loan is originated, the lender has the option to retain the loan in portfolio, sell the loan to the GSEs 
(either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac), or sell it to another non-GSE institution/lender, and thus, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model of conventional mortgage disposition. Table 3 reports the estimation results while Table 
4 reports the marginal probabilities for the four options. The model predicts that 57.2% of all conventional 
mortgage originations remain with the originating lender while 15.4% are sold to Fannie Mae, 11.3% are sold to 
Freddie Mac, and the remaining 16.1% are sold to other institutions. The high percentage of loans going to the 
GSEs (27%) is not surprising given their capital cost advantage. These predicted market shares compare to the 
actual mean market shares of 57.0, 14.9, 11.3 and 16.9%, for loans retained in portfolio, sold to Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and to non-GSE institutions, respectively (see Table 1). 
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Model of conventional loan disposition 
M ij=e (β j ′x i )∑k=13e (β j ′x i )          
Variable Sold to Fannie 
Mae 
  Sold to Freddie 
Mac 




Parameter S.E. χ2 statistic Parameter S.E. χ2 statistic Parameter S.E. χ2 statistic 
Constant −5.92 0.287 −20.6 −5.66 0.331 −17.1 −5.86 0.282 −20.8 
LTV 3.29 0.370 8.9 2.77 0.426 6.5 4.39 0.365 12.0 
I 26.51 0.906 29.3 16.74 1.067 15.7 21.09 0.880 24.0 
ΔHP1 −0.97 0.080 −12.1 −0.20 0.092 −2.2 −0.79 0.080 −9.9 
ΔHP10 −0.06 0.015 −4.2 0.33 0.017 19.1 0.08 0.015 5.1 
ΔU 0.35 0.235 1.5 0.28 0.272 1.0 4.21 0.227 18.5 
σΔHP −0.95 0.070 −13.7 −2.02 0.081 −25.0 −2.76 0.073 −37.7 
U −3.26 0.096 −33.9 −2.72 0.116 −23.5 −3.01 0.091 −33.1 
MINOR 0.93 0.025 37.0 0.08 0.029 2.8 0.50 0.025 20.1 
BGINI 0.17 0.011 14.5 −0.06 0.013 −4.9 −0.29 0.011 −25.7 
USRVD −1.14 0.034 −33.7 −0.90 0.038 −23.5 −0.16 0.034 −4.8 
Q2 −0.15 0.009 −17.0 0.03 0.010 3.4 −0.35 0.008 −42.2 
Q3 −0.02 0.005 −3.8 −0.11 0.005 −20.2 −0.43 0.005 −95.1 
Q4 0.01 0.011 1.0 0.01 0.013 0.4 −0.32 0.012 −27.4 
FRB 1.28 0.031 41.7 2.00 0.035 57.6 0.59 0.030 19.5 
FDIC −0.60 0.029 −20.4 0.55 0.033 16.9 −0.09 0.029 −3.1 
OTS −0.26 0.028 −9.3 0.47 0.032 14.8 0.26 0.028 9.2 
NCUA 1.77 0.073 24.4 2.46 0.081 30.4 −0.55 0.076 −7.3 
HUD 2.37 0.025 93.1 3.23 0.030 109.0 1.82 0.025 73.4 
NW 0.30 0.017 18.0 −0.32 0.019 −16.7 −0.13 0.016 −8.0 
MW −0.10 0.018 −5.3 −0.01 0.021 −0.5 −0.50 0.018 −28.1 
NYNJ −0.25 0.012 −20.8 −0.02 0.013 −1.6 −0.56 0.012 −48.1 
P −0.07 0.013 −5.2 −0.39 0.015 −25.8 −0.18 0.013 −14.2 
SW −0.20 0.021 −9.3 −0.24 0.025 −9.8 −0.39 0.021 −18.7 
GP −0.15 0.019 −7.7 0.11 0.022 5.0 −0.53 0.019 −28.1 
SE −0.48 0.021 −22.5 −0.39 0.024 −15.9 −0.56 0.021 −26.8 
NE 0.13 0.017 7.5 0.21 0.019 11.0 −0.19 0.017 −11.4 
MA −0.26 0.025 −10.3 −0.10 0.029 −3.5 −0.54 0.025 −21.6 
1995 −0.15 0.004 −35.1 −0.43 0.005 −89.0 −0.18 0.004 −44.0 
 
Table 4. Conventional loan disposition — Multinomial Logit Model Marginal Probabilities 
Variable Retain in Sell to Sell to Sell to  
Portfolio Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Non-GSEs 
Constant 1.45 −0.56 −0.36 −0.53 
LTV −0.88 0.29 0.14 0.46 
I −5.46 2.83 0.79 1.84 
ΔHP1 0.18 −0.11 0.01 −0.08 
ΔHP10 −0.02 −0.02 0.03 0.01 
ΔU −0.43 −0.08 −0.06 0.57 
σΔHP 0.47 −0.01 −0.14 −0.32 
U 0.75 −0.32 −0.16 −0.27 
MINOR −0.14 0.12 −0.02 0.04 
BGINI 0.02 0.03 0.00 −0.04 
USRVD 0.18 −0.14 −0.07 0.03 
Q2 0.04 −0.01 0.01 −0.05 
Q3 0.05 0.01 0.00 −0.06 
Q4 0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.04 
FRB −0.30 0.12 0.17 0.01 
FDIC 0.03 −0.09 0.07 −0.01 
OTS −0.03 −0.05 0.05 0.03 
NCUA −0.27 0.22 0.23 −0.18 
HUD −0.59 0.22 0.25 0.12 
NW 0.00 0.05 −0.04 −0.02 
MW 0.06 0.00 0.01 −0.07 
NYNJ 0.08 −0.02 0.01 −0.07 
P 0.05 0.00 −0.04 −0.02 
SW 0.07 −0.01 −0.01 −0.04 
GP 0.05 −0.01 0.03 −0.07 
SE 0.12 −0.04 −0.02 −0.06 
NE −0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.03 
MA 0.08 −0.02 0.01 −0.07 
1995 0.06 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01 
Baseline probability 0.57 0.15 0.11 0.17 
Looking at the local economic risk factors (1 and 10 year change in house prices, house price volatility, change in 
unemployment rates, and long-term unemployment levels), we find evidence to indicate that the GSEs purchase 
more loans in areas experiencing less economic risk, however, differences do exist in their purchase activity. For 
example, Fannie Mae market shares increases in areas with low house price growth while Freddie Mac purchase 
activity increases in areas with high house price growth. In contrast, mortgage originators tend to retain 
mortgages in portfolio from areas with high unemployment levels, high house price volatility, and high house 
price growth rates. Again, given that we are observing aggregate geographic variation in market shares, caution 
should be observed when drawing conclusions from these results as it is unclear to what degree private 
mortgage insurers may impact the geographic variation in market shares. Thus, if private mortgage insurers 
underwrite fewer mortgages in high risk areas, then GSE purchase activity would be correspondingly 
lower. Marschoun (2000) finds that the proportion of loans sold to the GSEs with high LTVs is lower in areas with 
high house price volatility. Thus, his results appear to confirm the importance of mortgage insurers in 
determining GSE market activity. 
Turning to the local demographic and policy factors, we find that both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac market 
shares are lower in MSAs with higher percentages of underserved census tracts, with Fannie Mae’s purchase 
activity being twice as sensitive as Freddie Mac (see Fig. 1). Interestingly, the share of mortgages retained by the 
originating lender increases substantially as the percent of applicants from underserved census tracts increases. 
Given the GSE affordable housing goals, this result is surprising and should be interpreted with caution. The 
purchase mortgages in this analysis are only mortgages sold in the year of origination for single-family home 
purchases and do not include mortgage refinance activity. Furthermore, HUD provides the GSEs with significant 
flexibility in meeting their affordable housing goals.23 Thus, these results should not be interpreted as indicating 
that the GSEs are not meeting their HUD mandated affordable housing goals. 
 
Fig. 1. Market share sensitivity to variation in MSA undeserved population percentage. 
 
The impact of an increase in the percentage of minority applications in an MSA has an interesting impact on the 
disposition of mortgages from that area. Fig. 2 shows the sensitivity of conventional mortgage disposition 
market shares for various percentages of minority applications. We note that the share of mortgages retained 
by the originating lender declines significantly as the percentage of minority applications increases. We also see 
a dramatic difference in GSE purchase activity with Fannie Mae market shares increasing from 13 to 26% as the 
minority application percentage increases while Freddie Mac market shares shows almost no change (declining 
from 12 to 10%). As with the results from the primary market, the marginal probabilities suggest that minority 
segregation in an MSA has almost no impact on loan disposition. 
 
Fig. 2. Market share sensitivity to variation in MSA minority population percentage. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper presents a cross-sectional analysis of the spatial distribution of single-family purchase loans in the 
primary and secondary mortgage markets. Our empirical results clearly indicate that FHA market shares are 
higher in cities having higher economic risk characteristics. Since we control for differences in demand resulting 
from variation in loan to value ratios and effective interest rates, the results suggest that FHA does provide 
stability to the primary mortgage market. Given the well-known adverse selection problem inherent in the FHA 
program, however, the higher market shares in higher risk cities will continue to reinforce the higher risk 
position of the FHA portfolio. It should be pointed out, however, that since this analysis does not examine the 
role of private mortgage insurers, we are unable to determine the institutions responsible for this outcome. 
In examining the disposition of conventional mortgages, we find some evidence that the GSEs purchase more 
loans from areas experiencing less economic risk with differences existing in the purchase activity of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. Overall, the marginal probabilities indicate that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase activity 
is relatively insensitive to short-run changes in local economic conditions. Sensitivity analysis, however, indicates 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase activity does vary with long-run economic indicators. Given the 
small variation in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac market shares across the economic risk factors, the results 
suggests that the GSEs are meeting their public policy objectives by serving the primary market with little spatial 
variation. 
Our analysis also sheds light on the response of the GSEs and conventional lenders to regulatory pressures to 
increase lending in geographically targeted underserved areas. As expected, we find higher FHA market shares in 
MSAs with greater proportion of underserved households. This confirms previous research showing that FHA 
does differentially serve underserved markets. In examining the disposition of conventional mortgages in the 
secondary market, our results indicate lower GSE purchase activity in MSAs with higher percentages of loans 
originated in underserved census tracts. Again, this finding does not indicate that the GSEs are not meeting their 
affordable housing goals since the sample of mortgages in this study only includes purchase activity for recent 
mortgage originations and not seasoned loans. As a result, the relationship between GSE activity and loans 
actually purchased from targeted census tracts requires further study. 
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1The current upfront FHA mortgage insurance premium on mortgages with terms greater than 15 years is 2.25% 
of the loan amount with an additional annual premium equal to 0.5% of the amount outstanding (HUD 
Mortgagee Letter 94-14). The annual private mortgage insurance premium for 30% coverage on a 90% 
LTV loan is 0.57% refundable and 0.56% non-refundable (source: GE Capital Services Mortgage 
Insurance). 
2GAO (1997) notes that, under FHA program guidelines, FHA mortgage underwriting criteria and premium 
structure do not deviate across geographic locations. 
3Other studies have examined the choice between conventional and government-insured mortgages using micro 
data on individual households (for example, Linneman and Wachter (1989), Gabriel and Rosenthal 
(1991), Goodman and Nichols (1997), Hendershott et al. (1997), and Pennington-Cross and Nichols 
(2000)). 
4For example, Ambrose and Warga (1996) calculated that between 1991 and 1994 the yield on ‘AAA’ rated 
finance industry debt was 85 basis points higher than similar GSE issued debt, giving the GSEs a 
significant capital cost advantage. 
5Fannie Mae has been quoted by A CBO Study in May 1996 entitled Assessing Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac as stating “Assessing the public costs and benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
requires them to be in all markets at all times.” For instance, Fannie Mae states that the purchase rate 
more than doubled in Texas when oil prices collapsed. 
6Freddie Mac’s 1994 Annual report (April 1994) on page 13 states “competition for shrinking originations caused 
by a slackening of credit and pricing standards in the primary market. Against this backdrop, we 
continue to maintain our discipline. Although this may occasionally reduce our business volume, this 
disciplined approach is consistent with our commitment to building shareholder value…”. 
7Due to concerns about the market influence of sub-prime and manufactured home lenders, loans made by 
lenders identified as primarily sub-prime and manufactured home lenders in HMDA are excluded. See 
the 3rd Quarter 1997 US Housing Market Conditions published by HUD Office of Policy Development and 
Research (PD&R). Randall Scheessele at HUD PD&R provided the list of lenders who report to HMDA and 
specialize in sub-prime and manufactured home lending. We exclude all non-FHA and non-GSE loans 
made by these lenders in HMDA. 
8While the vast majority of FHA insured loans are sold on the secondary market as Ginnie Maes, both GSEs have 
the authority to purchase FHA mortgages as well. In the secondary market we focus on conventional 
loans on their final disposition. For conventional loans, we classify mortgages as held in portfolio if the 
originating institution either retained the mortgage or sold it to an affiliated institution. Thus, all loans 
not held in portfolio or sold to the GSEs are classified as being sold to another lender. 
9Unfortunately, due to data reporting we may overestimate the number of loans recorded as retained in 
portfolio. For example, loans originated in December and sold into the secondary market in January 
would be recorded retained in portfolio. 
10Tables showing the spatial distribution of GSE purchase activity are available upon request. 
11The FHFB’s MIRS covers approximately 3% of all conventional, single family, purchase money mortgages 
granted. In 1995 MIRS included 128 782 loans reported by 253 savings associations, 17 (mostly large) 
mortgage companies, 130 commercial banks, and 35 savings banks. Thirty-three MSAs are reported 
quarterly and for each state. We use the MSA information where available and state level information 
otherwise. Since FHA loans are not covered in the survey and FHA loans tend to have higher LTVs, the 
MSA LTVs reported by MIRS will understate the actual loan-to-value ratios. 
12The average conventional LTV is regressed on (estimated signs of coefficients in parenthesis) previous year 
ownership rate (−), the fraction of the population 30 years old or younger (+), the fraction of the 
population between 30 and 50 years old (+), σΔHP (+),_ΔHP1(+), ΔHP10 (−), Q2 (+), Q3 (+), Q4 (+), LLHP (+), 
and year and region dummies. All coefficients are significant at the 95% level except for the σΔHP and 
the R2 using OLS is 0.57. 
13FHA does pursue deficiency judgments against investors and borrowers with a history of default. 
14Q1 indicate AL, AR, DC, GA, HI, MO, IA, MA, MD, MI, MS, RI, NE, NH, NM, NV, NY, TN, UT, VA, WV, WY, CO. 
15Q2 indicate AK, AZ, CA, ID, OK, ME, MN, MT, NC, OR, SD, TX, WA. 
16Q3 indicate CT, DC, FL, IL, IN, KS, KY, NJ, OH, PA, SC, VT. 
17Q4 indicate LA, ND, WI. 
18See Capozza et al. (1997), Deng and Calhoun (1997), and Ambrose and Capone (1998). 
19‘Underserved’ is the term introduced by HUD to describe census tracts with minority populations exceeding 
30% of the total and with median family income at or below 120% of the area median, or census tracts 
with median family income at or below 90% of the area median (HUD, 1995). On average, 27% of loans 
from census tracts in an MSA are classified as underserved. However, substantial variation exists across 
MSAs ranging from 0 to 74%. 
20BGINI is designed to measure the spatial distribution of different groups across the local region and is derived 
from the Lorenz curve with values between 0 and 100 with 100 indicating maximum segregation 
(see Massey and Denton, 1988). For our sample, we find the average MSA has a BGINI coefficient of 30, 
ranging from a minimum of 3 (Burlington, Vermont) to a maximum of 77 (Gary, Indiana). 
21During the period covered in this study, FHA guidelines specified that the maximum FHA loan limit was 38% of 
the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac loan limit for non-high cost areas and 75% of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
loan limit for high cost areas. Furthermore, an area’s maximum loan limit could be increased to the 
lesser of (a) 95% of the median one family house price for the area, or (b) 87% of the Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac loan limits. From May 1995 to present, local HUD offices have sole authority to adjust 
the loan limits on a county-by-county basis when interested parties submit a request showing evidence 
of increasing house prices. 
22See Greene (1990) for a discussion. 
23For example, the GSEs can meet their regulatory goals through the purchase of seasoned mortgages, which are 
not included in this analysis. 
 
